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Abstract. What is true information in today's world?  The hunt for information is on, not 
only in the private sector - market trends and enterprise data ' bur also on the public sector. 
Information is strongly linked with incentives: leak news and you have an extra rent. This 
paper tries to model the crucial role of information  and it's incentives in government and it 
started in the public sector. 
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1. Introduction 
t the end of the Second World War, a few major books appeared 
debating the consequences of the defeat of right wing 
authoritarianism, one may mention books such as books by Danish 
Alf Ross, Swedish Herbert Tingsten as well as Italiano Giovanni Sartori and 
Dutch Arene Lijphart, They all focused om the value og democracy as a 
method for collective decision-making, i.e. for a nation or country, They 
approached democracy as a political regime, baser upon the consent og a 
majority of voters. And they saw a necessary condition for democratic 
stability in the endorsement of democratic election outcomes by a 
substantial part of the electorate, 
The first scholar to look at the democratic regime economically was 
Anthony’s Economic Theory of Democracy from 1957 modeller two party 
competition as a marker game over vest winning position in space of voters 
attitudes, the median voter theorem of location. However, there is nothing 
here about the gains from democracy. 
Why set up parties in the first place? 
 
2. The needs of the people 
A democratic regime would find its rationale ultimately with the people 
of the country. Their needs og government would be decisive for the means 
and ends of the state. But in poli5cal   philosophy WWE find theorized og 
other ultimate objectives. If the state is the political organisation of the 
country all kinds of goals may be mentioned: 
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National power or aggrandisement, economic development,  equality., 
rule of law, dictatorship of the proletariat or of  the superior race, etc. Here 
I focus upon the demos as the principal, and the needs of government with 
the population. 
Who is the people? A democratic vision of the state presume a potive 
attitude to single individuals and his or her capacity to instruct a set of 
agents in the branches of government. Democracy may not be ideal but a 
platonic view is not recommendable. Neither Plato' philosophers nor 
Nietzsche ' Zoroaster would provide the demos with task of giving 
instructions to government and hold these agents responsible.  
The demos is the electorate, as it provides instructions to government 
agents along various channels. If you distrust the people to give 
instructions for policy making, you can deny their knowledge competence 
like Plato or dispose their trivial needs and projects like Nietzsche, you will 
not support the idea of democratic process. One cannot help wondering 
why such a sick man like Nietzsche in Engadin admired so intensifying the 
"great men" like Caesar and Napoleon. They were in reality his opposite 
and he ridiculously declares himself the greatest of philosophers in his 
autobiography. 
Democracy is government of the people, the electorate instructing 
political agents about the policies they want to be implemented. What, 
then, would be the best policies for the people? Many have thought about 
the real needs of the demos, but I will favour peace and lack of starvation 
as well as safe environment.  Let me discuss two other theories: 
1) Primary goods: Rawls came up with these concepts in order to 
identify what must be rendered to people in a well-ordered society. When 
these needs of ordinary man and women are met, justice deliberations may 
begin. 
This amounts to a too abstract approach to the question of what a well-
ordered  society is. Rights require an independent judiciary that exists in a 
minority of countries. What is more "primary" for people is survival, I. E. 
To live in peace and be able to feed oneself and breed in safety in the 
environment.  
A majority of the population of the world does not posses several of 
these Rawlsian primary goods. Are they really their primary or most 
important objectives?  
2) Capability: Sen has launched a different approach underlining each 
individual 's need for well-being: ”Poverty is not just a lack of money; it is 
not having the capability to realize one's full potential as a human being”, 
each person's capability that is. Capacity to what? A bad or evil person has 
also capabilities to well-being, right?  
I believe Thomas Hobbes was on the correct line of thought when 
focusing on civil war: “Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of 
war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the 
time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength 
and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there 
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is no place for industry... no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account 
of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual 
fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.” 
A country or society in a Hobbesian predicament is hardly worth living 
in. But it occurs from time to time.  Periods of internal warfare or external 
aggression, famines or ecological disasters result IN enormous suffering for 
citizens. Lack of violence,  access to food and safe shelter are the key 
"primary goods". 
Hobbes saw a great authority as the mechanism to stop or prevent the 
"omnium bellum contract omnes" - monarchy. Hobbes suggested that a 
monarch would be more trustworthy in keeping peace, law and order than 
Parliament. Strange! Sed quid custody ipso custos? Hobbes argued 
simplistically that it is more likely that a group of people start quarreling 
and fighting between each other than a single individual would  do that, so 
he outlined an authoritarian regime as the best. Hobbes failed to anticipate 
the principal-agent nature of political authority.  
Spinoza did not. His Political Treatise was written a couple of years after 
Leviathan  (1651) and offered a deep analysis of which regime would be the 
best given the egoism and aggressive behaviour of ordinary people? 
Although left unfinished, spinoza seems to have preferred democracy 
before monarchy and oligarchy on the basis of his assumption of 
selfishness of people: If each and every one  puts his/her interests first, then 
the of the people would carry less risks than monarchy or oligarchy! 
What happens when the "people " is divided and cannot speak with one 
voice - Rousseau' ideal of a unanimous "people" with one Volkgeist? 
Rousseau refused to accept the practical necessity of representation, 
allowing only administrators to implement the will of the people.  
In this romantic talk of "volume generale" as well as the so called 
enemies of the people we have a principal-agent model that restrains the 
political agents as much as possible. 
 
3. Democracy without agents: Transaction costs 
Swiss economists often claim that their country has a superb 
constitutional set of arrangement, viz direct democracy at all levels of 
government in a genuine federation. The argument is linked nor to 
Rousseau and his General Will but to Swedish world renowned Wicksell.  
Wicksell searched for Pareto effective allocation of local public goods 
thar benefitted each and every one. Since the good is lumpy individual 
charges will not work. Somehow there must be an aggregation of the 
individual willingness to pay such that the entire cost of the public good is 
covered. Since the "people" may be divided in two groups - one very eager 
minority and a lukewarm majority the collective  should reflect this fact, 
which is what unanimity does, forcing a common negotiated outcome. 
However, Wicksell' theory falters on two grounds: 
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A) 0pportunism, the group of people less willing to pay cam hold 
out  forcing the other people to pay much more, which could result in 
endless negotiations; 
B) It violates the rule of equality between YES and NO, favouring the 
status quo. What is unanimity concreteĺy - cf the General Will?  
Democratic decision-making is simple majority,  with equal chance for 
YES or NO. However,  Wicksell clearly foresaw that more costly decisions 
Could require qualified majority. This amounts to an insight into the 
economic search of inertia rules in constitution. 
The logic of Swiss democracy is not Wicksellian. It follows more political 
opportunity where small group use VOKSINITIATIV to overturn a law of 
Parliament as fewer than half of the electorate participates. 
 
4. Democracy and party; Agency costs  
Principal-agent modeling of political parties could adduce numerous 
attempts to capture a political "rent". The information asymmetrical 
advantages are all on the side of the party. We have in the large literature 
the following: 
a) Promise without intension to deliver  
b) False accusations or explanations of policy  
c) Denials of failure  
d) Use of public purse to pay for parties 
e) internal operation secrecy 
f) external animosity towards other parties and at times internal 
quarreling.  
Yet, despite these misgivings political parties are dominant players in 
many countries be they well-ordered or not. PARTITOCRAZIA may 
tempered by direct democracy - with few or many referenda. The 
evaluation of parties varies from one extreme - rip off agency - to another - 
cost effective transmission of signals from electorate to Parliament. Parties 
exist over the whole world,  openly or clandestinely. 
The logic is economies of collaboration: only highly charismatic 
politicians can handle all costs and burdens of an election. Ordinary 
politicians organise to share these efforts and divide the spoils afterwards. 
The party is keen about its reputation for honesty, cohesion and closeness 
to voters, fearing deviant behaviour of party members as much as voter 
volatile downside. 
The legislature and the population at large engage in principal-agent 
gaming continuously under each election period of 4 or 5 years. Legislative 
agents play with asymmetrical knowledge advantages saying that: 
- policy errors are abundant or just exaggerated  
- rules have been broken or they are denied  
- the economy goes well or faces imminent disaster  
- the environmental is threatened or just a little damaged  
-:new legislation is urgently needed but we are looking into the matter  
- too many foreigners arrive and yet we need more labour. 
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The legislature organises itself into political parties who confront each 
other with ideology, blame game and opportunistic behaviour with guile. 
Coalitions are created ad hoc in order to meet the 51 per cent requirement.  
 
5. Democracy as sovereignty of parliament  
The principal-agent interactions inherent in the regime of a Parliament 
suzerain  is shaped by the parties to a large extent. It so to speak unfetter 
the partitocrazia. This is British constitutional legacy from Cromwell.- to be 
found in a few countries with historic ties to England. 
Tactics as well as strategy on a Parliament suzerain fulfils all the 
implications of the theory of asymmetrical information in the relationship 
between principal and agents. Politics änd policymaking is in effect 
delegated to Parliament alone to be dominated by the Premier with no 
countervailing powers except a coming new election. 
Minister Caesarism is an extreme principal-agent model  mitigated  only 
by Common Law and a few other legal documents. This is British 
constitutional practice, never codified. It plays out differently in 
Westminster and Singapore, being merely contingency political theory, 
only theorised by Bagshot stressing it's Hobbesian tendencies when 
compared with the US constitutional outcome 1860 to 1865. 
The "living" British Constitutional framework includes no legal review: 
How could Parliament be wrong?  It could never enact rules that constrain 
it's power tomorrow. This is the outcome of the often present feudal 
struggle, which in very few countries ended in Parliament victory over the 
King. 
British constitutionalism is changing though, with devolution, human 
rights, Law Lords, referendum,  etc. Drawing upon recent events around 
so-called Brexit, one can say that the British people or electorate would 
benefit from judicial codification, as present confusion about minister 
Caesarism would subside. 
When Parliament is incapable of designing a majority Premier, then the 
so-called Committee Parliamentary Government or simply an intermediary 
solution with care taker, which neither promotes the principal’s interests 
generally. 
 
6. Democracy as checks and balance 
Information about politically relevant events and circumstances is much 
sought after. The mass media turns it out all day long. Political agents 
strive to be the first to know but also the population often follows the 
stream of research on a daily basis. Montesquieu's separation of powers 
entail stating that there are three kinds of expertise - executive, legislative 
and judicial - and they are to separated on the personal level.  
Access to information as well as control of information is central in day-
to-day political competition. New information alters the behaviour in 
principal-agent interactions. The dynamics of politics and policy are to a 
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large degree influenced or even shaped by the flow of new information. 
The arrival of new domestic or international news may have profound 
impact on the principal and the political agents: government and it's 
bureaucracy, legislative and the judiciary. In the search for correct 
information the principal may draw upon the separation of powers to 
reduce the asymmetric information advantage of agents, for instance by 
one agent engaging in oversight of another agent.  
Modern constitutional democracy comes two ideal-types: American 
presidentialism and constitutional monarchy or weak presidentialism. Both 
follow Montesquieu' separation of powers stating that the principal would 
be best off when government is divided onto three branches. In reality 
there is some institutional variations of the framing of hese key powers. 
What benefits the principal here or the population/electorate? Let me point 
out: 
I) Judicial autonomy: In general the principal wo welcome judicial 
integrity and the option to test public decision-making before the judiciary. 
More contested is the structure of legal review. Is it at all necessary for 
democratic decision-making?  
2) Judicial oversight: Enquiries into policy implementation by national 
government  bureaux, agencies,  boards or regional and local authorities is 
essential for reducing the information advantage of politicians and political 
parties. These enquiries may be recurring or special ones. The structure of 
judicial overview varies much from ordinary courts to special tribunals. 
Some countries have administrative courta as well as the Ombudsman -the 
Swedish, Danish or Swiss type. 
3) Complaint and Redress: The position of the single individual is much 
buttressedoes when the practice of public administration can be challenged 
in some court somehow. The possibility of appeal has enormous 
impact,  especially on anticipations or expectations on the of 
bureaucracy.  The Scandinavian contribution to constitutionalism - 
OMBUDSMAN - is important for ordinary citizens.  
Judicial enquiries can be done in several forms where for instance judges 
collaborate with legislators or experts from public administration.  
Legislation: Politicians in the legislature ' or groups of them like parties - 
have a strong wish to get re-elected for various reasons like position, 
income, prestige or good work. At elections one expect that falsity occurs as 
lying or exaggerations could pay off.  
Peltzman models the strategy of rational politicians to present a policy 
mix maximizing the probability of electoral victory.  
  
7. Premier, president and public administration  
The executive has a range of agencies at its command. Can they be 
trusted? As responsible for the performance in almost all public programs 
the executive depends upon the flow of information. How can the 
executive control for asymmetrical information - the basic incentives 
problematic in public administration?  
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The amount of resources controlled  by the executive as well as the 
bureaucracy and public enterprise sector under its wings is normally 
overwhelming. The public sector comprises public resource allocation and 
transfer payment,  making up between 20-55 per cent of GDP, depending 
on the political-economy regime of the country. How are these resources to 
ne used, ideally as well as  employed reality? 
 
7.1. Classic public finance models 
A penetrative attempt to derive a rational and just public sector for an 
advanced economy was made in the so-called public finance approach. The 
lessons of this exercise were also relevant for Third World countries. Using 
criteria on rationality in resource allocation as well as some criterion on 
justice in social security the public sector would remove market failures of 
various kinds. 
The successful public finance models were to be found in the analysis 
essay of efficiency,  micro or macro. But the concept of income and 
wealth  redistribution towards more of social justice proved very contested 
among social scientists and economists as well as philosophers. How much 
and in what forms? 
Consider, please, the difference between ultra liberal Nozick - no 
redistribution - and socialist Barry - equalise until impartiality. In any case 
the book by the Musgraves from 1980 is still instructive - Public Finance in 
Theory and Practice. 
 
7.2. Asymmetrical information  
Recognising the information advantage of the -executive and her/his 
agents forces one to acknowledge the role of opportunism with guile in 
political affairs. Enter things into the public sector like: 
- insincere voting 
- vote trading or cycling 
- embezzlement  
- bribery  
- kickback 
- conflict of interest  
- mishandling of emails  
- unlawful threat  
- favouritism or patronage 
- tribalism  
- ineffiency  
- deliberate misinformation  
- dishonesty  
- negligence or intended lack of competence  
- misuse of competence, power and office 
- prebendalization,  
- vote fraud. 
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The difference between constitutional democracy and other regimes is 
merely the comprehensive occurrence of these selfish tactics as well as the 
systematic absence of corrections and disclosure. The people as the ultimate 
principal of the polity can only be vigilant as electorate as well as instruct 
legislative and judicial agents to check and balance the executive and 
public administration. At the end of the line the firing option must be 
employed.  
The quality of the public sector can only be protected by countervailing 
powers. Countries that are ill-fated drown in government mismanagement. 
A country where an elite rules unhindered allows the capture of a huge 
rent for politicians.  
 
8. Conclusion  
The postmodern society is information writ large: quantity, speedy 
access, control, etc. When a person is more informed,  he or she sees the 
opportunities that come with it and tries to capitalise upon it. In public 
sector information asymmetry is a most important source of power and 
perhaps rent.  
In the history of political thought we encounter two philosophers who 
are especially relaxant for the principal-agent framework, viz Hobbes and 
Montesquieu.  
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